Opportunity Lost, Opportunity Found: A Proposal to Amend Maine\u27s Rule of Evidence 404 to Admit  Prior Acts  Evidence in Domestic Violence Prosecutions by Nadeau, Tina Heather
Maine Law Review 
Volume 62 Number 1 Article 13 
January 2010 
Opportunity Lost, Opportunity Found: A Proposal to Amend 
Maine's Rule of Evidence 404 to Admit "Prior Acts" Evidence in 
Domestic Violence Prosecutions 
Tina Heather Nadeau 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tina H. Nadeau, Opportunity Lost, Opportunity Found: A Proposal to Amend Maine's Rule of Evidence 404 
to Admit "Prior Acts" Evidence in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 62 Me. L. Rev. 351 (2010). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/13 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
OPPORTUNITY LOST, OPPORTUNITY FOUND: A 
PROPOSAL TO AMEND MAINE’S RULE OF 
EVIDENCE 404 TO ADMIT “PRIOR ACTS” 
EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PROSECUTIONS 
Tina Heather Nadeau 
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY MAINE, WHY NOW? 
II. THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN MAINE 
IV. MAINE’S 2008 CRIMINAL CODE AMENDMENTS 
 A. Impetus for Change 
 B. The Story Behind the Changes 
 C. What Are the Effects of These New Laws? 
V. MAINE RULE OF EVIDENCE 404 
 A. Exceptions Articulated by Rule 404(b) 
 B. Maine “Prior Acts” Jurisprudence from the 1800s to the Present 
 C. Evidence Rulings in the Sexual Assault and Child Sexual Abuse 
Contexts 
 D. Maine Prosecutors’ View of “Prior Acts” Admissibility  
 E. Has the Law Court Provided a Pathway to Admissibility?  
VI. AMENDING MAINE’S RULES OF EVIDENCE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS 
VII. CONCLUSION 
352 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
OPPORTUNITY LOST, OPPORTUNITY FOUND: A 
PROPOSAL TO AMEND MAINE’S RULE OF 
EVIDENCE 404 TO ADMIT “PRIOR ACTS” 
EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PROSECUTIONS 
Tina Heather Nadeau* 
“Not a week goes by that we don’t hear of another horrific event.  Domestic 
violence is a cancer that is eating at the fabric of our society.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION: WHY MAINE, WHY NOW? 
In 2008, thirty-one people were the victims of homicide in the state of Maine.2  
Even more startling: nineteen of these homicides stemmed from domestic 
violence,3 possibly the largest number of domestic-violence-related killings in the 
state’s history.  This means that nearly 70 percent of Maine’s homicides in 2008 
were the result of domestic violence.  Each year, the percentage of Maine’s 
homicides that derive from acts of domestic violence far exceeds the national or 
even the regional average.4  This is more than an anomaly.  It is a tragedy.  If 
Maine is serious about reducing its murder rate and saving the lives of Mainers, the 
most obvious place to start would be in curbing homicidal cases of domestic 
violence. 
Amendments made in 2007 (and implemented in February 2008) to Maine’s 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Maine School of Law; A.B. Bowdoin College, 2001.  I 
would like to thank my family and friends, as well as my professors, especially Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
for all their support and encouragement throughout this process.  This Comment is dedicated to Maine’s 
domestic violence victims and survivors, as well as the state’s prosecutors who struggle to tell their 
stories. 
 1. Sharon K. Mack, Statewide Forums Tackle Topic of Domestic Violence, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, 
July 12, 2008, at A1 (quoting James Ross, domestic violence investigator at the Somerset County 
District Attorney’s Office).  See also David Hench, 2008 Sees Surge in Maine Homicides; Mainers 
Should Not Fear That the State is Becoming Less Safe, Authorities Say, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, 
Mar. 1, 2008, at A1. 
 2. David Hench, Domestic Violence: Progress, Problems; An Analysis Outlines the Areas Needing 
Attention, Such as Services for Children Who See Abuse, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Feb. 25, 2009, at 
B1. See also WCSH6.com, Increase in Homicides Has Experts Looking for Trends, 
http://www.wcsh6.com/includes/tools/print.aspx?storyid=98584 (last visited Sept. 30, 2009). 
 3. MAINE DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, A REPORT TO THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND PUB. SAFETY FROM THE MAINE DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY PURSUANT TO L.D. 1990 at 2 
(2009) available at http://www.maine.gov/dps/Docs/LD%201990%20report.pdf. 
 4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/int_urbtab.htm.  In 2005, 
intimate homicides accounted for 5.8 percent of all homicides in large cities, while in small cities, the 
rate was 11.3 percent.  Id.  In suburban environments, the intimate homicide rate was 13 percent; and 
rural areas, the number spiked to 17.8 percent.  Id.  See also An Act to Protect Families and Enhance 
Public Safety by Making Domestic Violence a Crime: Hearing on L.D. 1627 Before the Joint Standing 
Comm. on Criminal Justice & Pub. Safety, 123rd Leg. (Me. 2007) [hereinafter Hearing on L.D. 1627] 
(testimony of G. Steven Rowe, then Attorney General of Maine.). 
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Criminal Code have criminalized particular instances of domestic violence as 
“enhanced” crimes of violence.5  This allows prosecutors to consider “prior acts” of 
domestic abuse when deciding how to charge a criminal defendant accused of a 
domestic-violence-related crime.6  These new laws additionally provide that 
prosecutors may introduce evidence of prior acts of domestic violence in the 
sentencing phase of an adjudication, provided that the defendant has either been 
found guilty by trial or has plead guilty.7  However, enhanced sentences and the 
allowance of evidence of prior acts into sentencing considerations does little to 
ensure that more batterers are actually convicted of domestic violence crimes.  
Under the revised Criminal Code, evidence of prior acts of domestic violence has 
the ability to impact only those batterers who are prosecuted successfully, or who 
decide to plead guilty.  At trial, however, evidence of a batterer’s prior acts of 
violence against his victim cannot be admitted, as they are generally prohibited by 
Maine Rule of Evidence 404.8  While the prosecutor and the sentencing judge have 
access to such evidence, the most important actors in a jury trial—the jurors—are 
not allowed to hear such evidence, view the charged crime in the context of an 
abusive relationship, and then render a decision.   
The vision of those who first suggested that Maine criminalize domestic 
violence is not reflected in the ultimate amendments to the Criminal Code as 
adopted by the Maine Legislature.9   Under the original construction of the bill, 
domestic violence itself would constitute a crime under Maine law,10 encompassing 
a variety of behaviors under its provision and allowing prosecutors to bring forward 
evidence that would tend to prove domestic violence as a “course of conduct” 
crime.11  Once the initial bill was divided into particularized, temporal, and 
incident-specific crimes, the evidentiary benefits of the initial bill, as well as the 
bill’s theoretical and practical thrust, were destroyed.12  The Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court, which promulgates and has power to amend its Rules of Evidence,13 
could help address this evidentiary gap between charging and sentencing by 
amending its Rules of Evidence to allow for prior acts of violence to be admissible 
                                                                                                     
 5. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17-A, § 207(A) (2008); infra Part IV. 
 6. See infra Parts IV.C, V. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Maine Rule of Evidence 404, in full,  reads: 
(a) Character evidence generally.  Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused.  Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of witness.  Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity therewith. 
ME. R. EVID. 404. 
 9. See generally L.D. 1627 (123rd Legis. 2007). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing the legislative history behind L.D. 1627). 
 13. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-A (2008). 
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in domestic-violence-related prosecutions under the exception of acts which tend to 
show relationship between the parties.  Amending the Rules of Evidence to 
construe prior acts of relationship to include a host of behaviors within the 
domestic violence context would help revive some of the power of the original 
legislation by recognizing that domestic violence is unique and that reducing the 
crime of domestic violence to a particularized incident fails to reflect the realities 
of battering. 
This Comment will first explain the dynamics of domestic violence, focusing 
on emerging trends in legal scholarship, which has begun to reflect the social 
science behind understanding domestic violence.  Next, this Comment will discuss 
domestic violence in Maine in order to set the context for the proposed 
amendments to the Criminal Code.  This Comment will then look at the Criminal 
Code amendments themselves, including the reasoning behind them, a behind-the-
scenes look at the significant changes made during the legislative process of 
recommendation and adoption, and the actual and potential effects of these 
amendments on the criminal justice response to domestic violence.  Thereafter, this 
Comment will then move into Maine’s Rules of Evidence, particularly the 
development of the State’s jurisprudence surrounding Rule 404, and the evidence 
ban on introduction of prior acts to demonstrate propensity to commit domestic-
violence-related crimes. 
In addition, this Comment will review the results of a survey from some of 
Maine’s prosecutors concerning their ability to introduce evidence of prior acts in 
domestic-violence-related prosecutions.  Moreover, this Comment will argue that 
in order to reintroduce much of the power of the original Criminal Code proposals 
to the Legislature, the Law Court should amend the Rules of Evidence to specify 
that in domestic-violence-related prosecutions, prior acts evidence should be given 
broad admissibility as it bears on the relationship between the two parties.  Finally, 
this Comment will contend that by amending the Rules of Evidence, the Court will 
help to better close the gap between charging and sentencing, giving the 2007 
domestic violence Criminal Code amendments much of the power they need to 
truly be effective in combating domestic violence in the State of Maine. 
Maine has a compelling state interest in facilitating the prosecution of repeat 
batterers.  Several states already have adopted similar evidentiary proposals—but, 
as we will see, in a different theoretical framework—because of compelling 
interests and public policy considerations in ensuring the effective criminal 
prosecution of batterers.14  Domestic violence prosecutions often are hampered by a 
host of evidentiary issues, which have become all-the-more pronounced given the 
United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Crawford v. Washington15 and 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra Part VI.  
 15. 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding, in general, that “testimonial” out-of-court statements by witnesses 
are excluded from evidence under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witnesses are unavailable and 
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness; holding, more specifically, that the 
admission into evidence of the wife’s out-of-court statements to police officers violated the 
Confrontation Clause).  See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence 
and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing the impact of Crawford on 
domestic violence prosecutions). 
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Giles v. California.16  Evidence-based domestic violence prosecutions, such as 
those implemented by the Cumberland County District Attorney’s office, would 
benefit from allowing prior specific acts during the guilt phase of the trial and as 
additional leverage for prosecutors during plea negotiations with the accused 
batterer.  Until our criminal code can reflect accurately the realities of domestic 
violence—an opportunity lost during the code approval process with the Criminal 
Law Advisory Commission in 200717—the best hope victims and prosecutors have 
for making domestic-violence-related charges “stick” is to allow the introduction of 
prior acts evidence to contextualize the specified incidents criminalized by the 
latest code amendments.  This Comment argues that by not allowing jurors to 
consider incidents of domestic violence within their proper context, domestic 
violence will never be truly criminalized in our State. 
II. THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
The term “domestic violence” encompasses a wide variety of behaviors 
through which an abusive partner exerts power and control, not all of which 
necessarily involve physical violence.18  For example, financial control, property 
damage, emotional terrorism, and forced isolation are all non-physical methods that 
an abuser employs to subjugate his victim.19  Physical violence is the most obvious 
manifestation of the abuser’s attempt at power and control—and the one to which 
the criminal justice system most readily responds.  “Violence need only symbolize 
the threat of future abuse in order to keep the victim in fear and control her 
                                                                                                     
 16. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (holding that the doctrine of “forfeiture by wrongdoing,” as adopted by 
the California Supreme Court, was not an exception to the Confrontation Clause at the time of the 
nation’s founding and is therefore unconstitutional).  For a discussion of the potential impact of Giles on 
domestic violence prosecutions, see generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles: The 
Relevance of “Domestic Violence Context,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1288122. 
 17. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1351-54.  See also infra Part IV. 
 18. Domestic violence survivor and advocate Ann Jones argues that the term “domestic violence” 
obfuscates more than it elucidates.  See ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE’LL BE DEAD: BATTERING & HOW 
TO STOP IT 81 (2000).  “Domestic violence is one of those gray phrases, beloved of bureaucracy, 
designed to give people a way of talking about a topic without seeing what’s really going on,” she 
writes.  Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).  The phrase “wife torture,” she adds, would help 
conjure the scenes between beatings: the sullen husband, withdrawn and sulking, or angry 
and intimidating, dumping dinner on the floor, throwing the cat against the wall, 
screaming, twisting a child’s arm, needling, nagging, manipulating, criticizing the bitch, 
the slut, the cunt who never does anything right, who’s ugly and stupid, who should keep 
her mouth shut, who should spread her legs now, who should be dead, who will be if 
she’s not careful.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
For the sake of consistency, if not accuracy, I will employ the term “domestic violence” in this 
Comment.  Throughout this Comment, I will refer to “batterers” as “he” and “victims” as “she.”  The 
reason for this is to acknowledge the gendered nature of domestic violence, in which 85 percent of 
intimate partner violence reported and recorded by law enforcement authorities is perpetuated by men 
against women.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003).  
 19. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, JUDITH G. GREENBERG & CLARE DALTON, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (2d ed. 2008). 
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behavior.”20   
Psychologist Lenore Walker first characterized abusive relationships as being 
comprised of three distinct phases in her foundational 1979 work, The Battered 
Woman.21  The “Cycle of Violence,” according to Dr. Walker, includes “the 
tension-building phase; the acute battering incident; and the tranquil, loving (or at 
least non-violent) phase that follows.”22  “During the tension-building phase,” 
writes Dr. Walker, “minor battering incidents occur [including] slaps, pinches, 
controlled verbal abuse, and psychological warfare.”23  It is during this phase that 
the victim tries to placate the abuser, to avoid the inevitable explosion of violence 
that will follow it.24  The physical incidents escalate into the “acute battering 
incident,” which Dr. Walker characterizes by “rampage, injury, brutality, and 
sometimes death.”25  After the acute battering incident comes the “honeymoon 
phase,”26 as the batterer feels remorse for his violent behavior and attempts to make 
amends with his victim.27  It is during this phase that the victim, if she reported the 
acute battering incident to the police, will have contact with the prosecutor, which 
often results in recanted statements and an unwillingness to cooperate.28  The 
victim often thinks that “things will get better.”  But, as Dr. Walker notes, the cycle 
of violence will begin again, resulting in more violent and more acute battering.29  
The victim may also be unwilling to testify for a multitude of reasons, including 
intimidation by the batterer, threats of retaliation, and cultural or familial 
pressures.30 
According to former domestic violence prosecutor Professor Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, “[T]he law applied to domestic abuse conceals the reality of an 
ongoing pattern of conduct occurring within a relationship characterized by power 
                                                                                                     
 20. Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar & Rene Ellis, The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in 
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2128 (1993), reprinted in SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, 
at 51. 
 21. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 56 (discussing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 
(1980)). 
 22. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY 
RESPONDS 42 (1989), reprinted in SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 56. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 326 (1992). 
 27. WALKER, supra note 22, at 44. 
 28. See Walker, supra note 26. 
 29. WALKER, supra note 22, at 46. 
 30. Andrea M. Kovach, Note, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic Violence for Propensity 
Purposes: A Brief Look at Its Past, Present, and Future, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1115, 1126.  Additionally, 
battered women have a realistic fear of leaving their batterers, as a woman is 75 percent more likely to 
be murdered when she tries to flee or had fled the abusive relationship.  Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles 
to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct. 28, 1999, at 19-20.  Women often stay 
in these relationships because they feel it is their safest option.  See id.  The theory of “separation 
assault” was first developed by Martha R. Mahoney in her article, Legal Images of Battered Women: 
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65 (1991) (stating that “separation assault is the 
attack on the woman’s body and volition in which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, 
retaliate for the separation, or force her to return”). 
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and control.”31  Professor Tuerkheimer argues that, while outside of criminal law, 
domestic violence is understood “as patterned in nature and largely defined by non-
physical manifestations of domination,”32 the traditional criminal law has failed to 
adopt this more expansive and inclusive view, instead myopically focusing on 
discrete and overt physical acts.33  In so doing, argues Professor Tuerkheimer, the 
criminal law as it currently stands is not in a position to either address or remedy 
battering.34  
Additionally, batterers notoriously are prone to repeat their actions; rates of 
recidivism are astonishingly high.  Following a study, the American Medical 
Association found that 47 percent of batterers beat their partners at least three times 
a year, while the recidivism rate for sexual offenders is only 7.7 percent three years 
after their convicted offense.35  There seems to be evidence that as the years go on, 
batterers grow more brazen, more violent, and more effective at subjugating their 
victims.  “Many of the violent acts that prompt domestic violence arrests would be 
classified as felonies if committed against strangers,” remarked sociologist Evan 
Stark, “and most of the men arrested resemble the worst class of felons: they are 
repeat offenders, are typically unrepentant, and frequently retaliate against, 
threaten, or otherwise intimidate their victims after an arrest.”36  These facets of 
repeat batterers’ behavior, contends Stark, “suggest a high-profile crime worthy of 
an aggressive criminal justice response.”37 
Stark also proposes a model to understand domestic violence that reflects the 
                                                                                                     
 31. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 960-61 (2004) (critiquing 
traditional criminal law structures as inadequate to address the realities of domestic violence). 
 32. Id. at 961. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 962, 1018-19.  Professor Tuerkheimer proposed in this article a battering statute, which 
reads as follows: 
A person is guilty of battering when: 
He or she intentionally engages in a course of conduct directed at a family or 
household member; and 
He or she knows or reasonably should know that such conduct is likely to result in 
substantial power or control over the family or household member; and 
At least two acts comprising the course of conduct constitute a crime in this 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 1019-20.  Professor Tuerkheimer further provides definitions for the following: 
“Family or household member,” means spouses, former spouses, adults related by 
consanguinity or affinity, an adult with whom the actor is or has been in a continuing 
relationship of a sexual or otherwise intimate nature, and adults who have a child in 
common regardless of whether they have been married or have resided together at any 
time. 
“Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct comprised of a series of acts over a 
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. 
“Crime” means a misdemeanor or a felony.  
Id.  Professor Tuerkheimer was instrumental in the original drafting of L.D. 1627, calling for the 
codification of “domestic violence” as a course of conduct crime. 
 35. Linell A. Letendre, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of 
Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973, 998 (2000). 
 36. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 61 
(2007). 
 37. Id. 
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work of Professor Tuerkheimer.  He writes, “[T]he treatment of abuse as a series of 
discrete acts rather than as a unitary phenomenon . . . is an ideological strategy that 
should be assessed like any other political choice, by whether its consequences are 
benign or harmful, rather than as an objective reflection of reality.”38  Stark further 
argues that in viewing specific incidents of domestic violence outside of their 
battering context, law enforcement fails to recognize the escalating danger and 
frequency of the assaults, which can lead to more severe injury and eventually 
death.39  This Author agrees with Professor Stark’s central premise that “[t]he only 
way to afford genuine protection to abused women is to provide an enhanced 
response predicated on the course of malevolent conduct to which they are being 
subjected and their special vulnerability due to sexual inequality.”40  Domestic 
violence all-too-often has been relegated to second-class misdemeanor status 
within the criminal law.  Understanding domestic violence as a course of conduct 
crime would cast a more accurate light on the severity and escalating nature of the 
conduct within its proper relationship context. 
The dynamics of domestic violence lead to often frustrated attempts to 
prosecute and convict the perpetrators of the violence.  Failure to cooperate can 
manifest itself in several ways: victims not feeling comfortable testifying, victims 
wanting to “drop charges,” or, in many instances, victims testifying on behalf of 
defendants.  This reluctance to cooperate with the prosecution can be traced to 
many factors: threats of retaliation and intimidation by the defendant; succumbing 
to the batterer’s persuasive techniques; convincing the victim that things will get 
better; cultural or family pressures to not air dirty laundry or try to work it out; or a 
belief that cooperation with the prosecution is useless at best, dangerous at worst.41  
As domestic-violence-related crimes see some of the lowest successful prosecution 
rates within the criminal justice system, victims’ belief that cooperation is futile has 
some grounding in reality.42 
In a recent article focusing on domestic violence prosecutions in Maine, Judith 
Lewis noted that: 
[The] disconnect between domestic violence as defined by the law and domestic 
violence as experienced by the battered woman not only misrepresents a battered 
woman’s experiences, but also inhibits successful prosecution of batterers by 
limiting the prosecution’s ability to present its case and its evidence in the full 
context of the battering relationship.43   
Though Lewis was advocating for the admission of expert testimony about 
battering in domestic violence prosecutions, her underlying rationale is the same as 
that advanced by domestic violence scholars and this Comment: in order for the 
jury to understand the charge alleged in such crimes, they have to be allowed 
access to evidence of the context and course of the battering relationship. 
                                                                                                     
 38. Id. at 94. 
 39. Id. at 99. 
 40. Id. at 368. 
 41. See generally Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in the Prosecution of 
Domestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953 (2000). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Judith Lewis, Setting the Wrong Right: Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony on Dominance 
and Control, 23 ME. B.J. 48, 48 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
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The important lesson to draw from the emerging legal commentators’ work is 
that domestic violence cannot be understood fully as particularized incidents of 
explosive violence.  According to domestic violence attorney Fredrica L. Lehrman, 
“Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive power and control.  This prosecution 
theme should resonate from every piece of evidence gathered, every pretrial motion 
filed, and every trial strategy employed.”44  As we shall see, the ultimate decision 
over the admissibility of such evidence will have far-reaching effects on the 
preparation and trial strategy of the prosecutor and ultimately on the success of 
prosecuting batterers effectively. 
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN MAINE 
Over the past decade, approximately 50 percent of homicides in Maine each 
year involve domestic violence.45  In 2005, domestic violence assaults increased by 
5.2 percent, according to the Maine Department of Public Safety.46  Also in 2005, 
close to 5,500 reported assaults happened between family or household members, 
which averages one assault every hour and a half.47  However, underreporting is an 
enormous hindrance to compiling accurate data on the actual incidence rate of 
domestic violence in the state. 
Between the years of 1995 and 2005, reported incidents of domestic violence 
in Maine increased by 22 percent; 2006 data show a ten-year high in the number of 
reported domestic violence assaults.48  In 2005, domestic violence assaults 
represented 46.1 percent of all assaults in Maine, also a ten-year high.49  Weapon 
use during domestic violence assaults is also prevalent in Maine.  Protection From 
Abuse Orders comprise 13 percent of the Maine’s district court civil docket, “but 
limitations in Maine’s court system, such as inconsistent safety measures, too few 
personnel, and limited access to legal representation” serve as demonstrable 
barriers to victim safety throughout the state, particularly in its rural regions.50  
According to the STOP Implementation Program, nearly 60 percent of all domestic 
violence assaults are perpetrated by adult men against adult women, with 16 
percent perpetrated by adult women against adult men.51  Fifteen percent of 
reported domestic violence homicides involved children, with 11 percent of 
                                                                                                     
 44. Pretrial Motions, Domestic Violence Prac. & Proc. (West) § 7:47 (Aug. 2007). 
 45. Letter from G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, to the Joint Standing Comm. on Criminal 
Justice & Public Safety (May 2, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rowe Letter]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. ME. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY JUSTICE ASSISTANCE COUNCIL, 2007-2010: IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN FOR THE STOP (SERVICES*TRAINING*OFFICERS*PROSECUTORS) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
PROGRAM 13-14 (2006), available at http://www.state.me.us/dps/cjg/docs/VAW0710%20STOP%20 
Implementation%20Plan.pdf [hereinafter STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROGRAM].  The levels of 
reported domestic violence assaults in Maine, from 1995 to 2006, are as follows: 1995: 4,412; 1996: 
3,914; 1997: 4,222; 1998: 3,855; 1999: 3,986; 2000: 4,486; 2001: 4,922; 2002: 4,813; 2003: 5,364; 
2004: 5,188; 2005: 5,459; 2006: 5,549.  Maine Marks, Number of Domestic Violence Assaults in Maine: 
1995-2005, http://www.mainemarks.org/indicators2008/indT.html. 
 49. STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROGRAM, supra note 48, at 14. 
 50. National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Facts: Maine, 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/Maine.pdf. 
 51. STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROGRAM, supra note 48, at 15 fig.8. 
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domestic violence assaults falling into the “other” category.52  The STOP 
committee reports, “With the high share of murders occurring in a domestic 
violence setting and the high number of rapes in the state, violence against women 
constitutes a significant share of the violent crime in Maine.”53 
Perhaps the most disturbing figures of all these reports is data concerning the 
percentage of Maine’s homicides that result from domestic violence; the number of 
these homicides from Maine’s rural communities is even more startling.  In 2008, 
Maine saw more than thirty homicides; of these homicides, nineteen of them 
stemmed from domestic violence, and four of these homicides involved child 
victims.54  Between 1985 and 1995, 44 percent of all homicides in Maine were 
linked to domestic violence.55  In the past decade, that number has increased to 
nearly 50 percent.56  And though only 40 percent of Maine residents fall into the 
category of “rural,” the link between rurality and domestic violence homicide is 
undeniable.  Between 1990 and 1995, more than 60 percent of all domestic-
violence-linked homicides in Maine took place in rural communities.57  From 2000 
to 2004, the percentage of rural domestic violence homicides in Maine spiked to 
more than 80 percent.58  This tracks closely with the national trend of increased 
                                                                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 17. 
 54. Megan V. Malloy, “A Terrible Year” for Homicide, KENNEBEC J.-MORNING SENTINEL, Aug. 
31, 2008, at A1.  Compare this number to 2007, when out of twenty-one total homicides, eight had 
domestic violence roots.  “Eight individual men murdered eight people in acts of Domestic Violence 
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September 30, 2007, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WATCH (Maine Coalition to End Domestic Violence, 
Bangor, ME), Dec. 2007 at 2. 
 55. MAINE COALITION FOR FAMILY CRISIS SERVICES, DOMESTIC ABUSE IN MAINE: DATA PROJECT 
1990-1995, at 26 (1996) [hereinafter DATA PROJECT 1990-1995]. 
 56. Rowe Letter, supra note 45. 
 57. Numbers compiled by Author from data in DATA PROJECT 1990-1995, supra note 55, at 26-32.  
Out of nine domestic violence homicides in 1990, six were rural (Steep Falls, Rockport, Lebanon, 
Richmond, Dover-Foxcroft, Castine); in 1991, three of eight domestic violence homicides were rural 
(Lebanon, Trenton, Peru); in 1992, seven of fourteen domestic violence homicides were rural (Franklin, 
Presque Isle, South Hope, Embden [two murders], Houlton, Van Buren); in 1993, six of eleven domestic 
violence homicides were rural (Manchester [two murders], Harrington, Monticello, Skowhegan, 
Sangerville); in 1994, nine out of eleven domestic violence homicides were rural (Stonington, Breman, 
Pittsfield, Lagrange [two murders], Mt. Vernon, Belfast, Sidney, Rockland); and in 1995, seven of ten 
domestic violence homicides were rural (Heron, Verona, Brownfield [three murders], Springvale, 
Fairfield).  Id. 
 58. Numbers compiled by Author from data in MAINE COALITION FOR FAMILY CRISIS SERVICES, 
DOMESTIC ABUSE IN MAINE: DATA PROJECT III, 2000-2004, 47-49 (2005) [hereinafter DATA PROJECT 
III].  In 2000, six of six domestic violence homicides were rural (St. Agatha, Swanville, Township 10, 
Winthrop, Greenbush, Camden); in 2001, five of five domestic violence homicides were rural 
(Jonesboro, Chelsea, Carmel, Tremont, Swan’s Island); in 2002, two of three domestic violence 
homicides were rural (Sweden, Milo); in 2003, five of eight domestic violence homicides were rural 
(Casco, Lisbon Fall, Fairfield, Sabattus, South Berwick); and in 2004, nine of eleven domestic violence 
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percentages of rural intimate partner homicide.59  Not only is domestic violence a 
growing problem in Maine, its deadly effects are becoming more frequent and 
more alarming for Maine’s rural areas. 
Alcohol abuse and its destructive effects are inextricable from domestic 
violence incidents in Maine.60  In rural areas, alcohol far outpaces its more 
notorious counterparts (cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine) in its human toll.  
“Nearly 52 percent of adults in Maine report that someone in their family has a 
severe alcohol problem.  Nearly 100,000 Mainers [or nearly 10 percent] are 
considered alcohol abusers or alcoholics.”61  According to national statistics, 80 
percent of Maine residents in treatment for substance abuse are addicted to alcohol; 
nationally, the percentage is closer to fifty.62  When law enforcement responds to a 
domestic violence call in Maine, they know that they are likely going to arrest at 
least one drunken person, most often the perpetrator of the abuse.63  Portland Police 
Detective Lisa Beecher, responsible for investigating nearly 1,000 domestic 
violence incidents each year, has commented that victims often say, “‘If he hadn’t 
been drinking, he wouldn’t have hit me.’  In many of the homes [the Portland 
Police Department goes] to, there’s an awful lot of alcoholism out there.  Alcohol 
isn’t the cause of domestic violence, but I don’t think anyone can dispute the fact it 
exacerbates the problems that already exist.”64  Cumberland County Deputy 
District Attorney Meg Elam reports, “Virtually every domestic [violence] case we 
see, there’s alcohol involved.”65  Alcohol abuse and domestic violence in Maine 
cannot be separated, and, as the state and nation’s economic situation worsens, the 
problem of alcohol and domestic abuse will become more pronounced and deadlier. 
Despite increased statewide attention to the problem of domestic violence in 
Maine over the past two decades, reported incidents of domestic violence are not 
decreasing.  Funding for domestic violence crisis groups and education efforts 
remains woefully inadequate, and, with the current state budgetary and economic 
crisis, many victims cannot access the court system in a meaningful way.66  
                                                                                                     
homicides were rural (Masardis, Waldoboro, Lee, Boothbay Harbor [two murders], Fort Kent, Brooks, 
Dixfield, Farmingdale).  Id. 
 59. See Adria Gallup-Black, Twenty Years of Rural and Urban Trends in Family and Intimate 
Partner Homicide: Does Place Matter?, 9 HOMICIDE STUD. 149, 163-64 (2005). 
 60. See Barbara Walsh & Meredith Goad, The Deadliest Drug: Maine’s Addiction to Alcohol: 
MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Oct. 19, 1997, at A1; Barbara Walsh, Police Find Drunkenness Feeds 
Domestic Violence, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 24, 1997, at A12. 
 61. Maine Pays Dearly as Families are Ruined by Alcohol Abuse, MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Oct. 
26, 1997, available at http://pressherald.mainetoday.com/specialrpts/alcohol/d8summ.htm. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. “Nationally, alcohol is found in 50 to 60 percent of domestic violence cases.  Studies show 
that one-third to one-half of all batterers are reported to be problem drinkers.”  Walsh, Police Find 
Drunkenness Feeds Domestic Violence, supra note 60, at A12. 
 65. Id. at A12.  See also Barbara Walsh, Drinking Plays Role as Partner in Crime, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, Oct. 24, 1997, at A1 (stating that “[n]ationally, rates of domestic violence are nearly 15 
times higher in homes where batterers commonly get drunk”). 
 66. The worsening economic situation will impact domestic violence advocacy in immediate ways.  
Executive Director Deborah Shepherd of the Family Violence Project warned that in light of Governor 
John Baldacci’s proposed budget cuts, nine of the state’s domestic violence programs might close.  
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Domestic violence has reached epidemic levels in the state, and in order to more 
fully combat it, advocates in the past several years have attempted to convince 
lawmakers that the way Maine criminalizes domestic violence must reflect the 
realities of domestic violence.   
IV. MAINE’S CRIMINAL CODE AMENDMENTS 
A.  Impetus for Change 
In January 2007, Maine Senate President Beth Edmonds and Maine Coalition 
to End Domestic Violence Coordinator Gretchen Ziemer published an editorial in 
the Kennebec Journal entitled, “It’s Time for Maine to Make Battering a Crime.”67  
“Our current law,” wrote Edmonds and Ziemer, “was not written in such a way to 
take into account the pattern of long-term behaviors that constitute domestic 
violence.”68  Domestic violence, they contended, is “a matter of power and control, 
in which the abusers will do whatever they believe is necessary to maintain control 
of their victims.  They do this through a series of manipulative and abusive tactics 
that develop and occur over time.”69  Furthermore, the authors argued, “[T]he 
complete picture of domestic violence is relevant to gaining a full understanding of 
the illegal behaviors.”70   
Also, Edmonds and Ziemer announced that they were working on legislation, 
later known as L.D. 1627, to “allow victims to tell their full story, providing an 
accurate view of the abusive behavior.  Right now, they can’t and this can result in 
difficulty in holding abusers legally responsible for their actions.”71  Edmonds and 
Ziemer articulated two major benefits that such legislation could provide: (1) “By 
defining and classifying battering as a crime, we will more effectively prosecute 
abusers because their numerous acts of abuse will not be ignored”;72 and (2) 
“Repeated batterings will provide a foundation for more stringent punishment and a 
strong message will be sent to our whole community that domestic violence will 
not be taken lightly.”73  With the announcement of their plans, Emonds, Ziemer, 
and dozens of lawyers, victim advocates, and legislators began work crafting the 
legislation that would become L.D. 1627.   
In March 2007, Senate President Edmonds submitted L.D. 1627, “An Act to 
Protect Families and Enhance Public Safety by Making Domestic Violence a 
Crime,” to the Joint Standing Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety.74  
They announced the bill at the Maine Statehouse Hall of Flags on March 15, 
                                                                                                     
Mechele Cooper, What Anti-Violence Budget Cuts Will Look Like, KENNEBEC J.-MORNING SENTINEL, 
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1, available at http://morningsentinel.mainetoday.com/news/local/4870813.html. 
 67. Beth Edmonds & Gretchen Ziemer, Op-Ed., It’s Time for Maine to Make Battering a Crime, 
KENNEBEC J., Jan. 23, 2007, at A5. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Edmonds & Ziemer, supra note 67, at A5. 
 74. See L.D. 1627 (123rd Legis. 2007). 
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2007.75  “How many more deaths will it take before we realize whatever it is we’re 
doing is not enough?” asked Senator Edmonds.76  According to Senator Edmonds, 
the bill would criminalize domestic violence by “get[ting] at the signature aspect of 
domestic violence, which is its nature as a course of conduct, not a single event.”77  
Laura Harper, director of public policy for Maine Women’s Lobby, reinforced 
Senator Edmonds’s remarks:  
Because Maine law currently does not define the pattern of violence that battered 
women experience as a crime, law enforcement and prosecutors lack a critical tool 
for stopping abuse.  We know that domestic violence occurs over a period of time 
and encompasses a continuum of abuse; now it’s time for the law to recognize that 
as well . . . . 
  . . . 
  . . . Currently, Maine prosecutes domestic violence crimes on a case-by-case 
basis without regard to the patterned behaviors perpetrators use to maintain a 
power and control dynamic.  Existing crimes used to prosecute domestic violence 
such as assault, criminal threatening, terrorizing, stalking, reckless conduct, 
violation of a protection order, and violation of condition of release, are incident-
based and conceive of a crime that occurs in an instant of time.  Currently, charges 
cannot be elevated to account for more severe cases and do not adequately account 
for the dynamics of domestic violence.78 
Co-sponsor of L.D. 1627, Representative Leila Percy, said that if the bill passed, 
Maine would be “poised to become the first state in the nation to establish domestic 
violence as a crime, with specific sentencing guidelines.”79  Recognizing the input 
of attorneys and advocates from across the state, Percy noted that domestic 
violence as a course of conduct crime distinguishes it from a “bar room fight.  It is 
rare for domestic violence to be a one-time, isolated situation.”80  Percy added that 
the new crime designation would “take into account the pattern of violence [of 
domestic abuse] and . . . provide prosecutors and district attorneys more leverage to 
prosecute offenders.”81  Percy also quoted a state prosecutor, who said, “To change 
the culture, sometimes you have to change the law.”82  Percy advocated for the 
change in law and culture to make “Maine homes safe.”83 
Then Attorney General Steven Rowe remarked, 
[A]ssault is not the only crime that is regularly occurring in Maine families.  The 
other crimes involved criminal threatening, terrorizing, stalking and reckless 
conduct.  While these types of crimes involving family and household members 
are commonly referred to [as] crimes of “domestic violence,” there is no crime 
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with this official label in Maine.84   
In recognizing that the state’s “current system of accountability is not working,” 
Rowe continued to explain that “if an abuser who has a prior domestic assault 
conviction commits a second domestic assault, it is clear that he has engaged in a 
course of violent conduct that demonstrates a heightened risk of future harm to the 
victim.”85  Rowe concluded, “[u]ltimately, this bill is about saving lives.”86 
In addition, then Speaker of the Maine House of Representatives Glenn 
Cummings acknowledged that “[b]y creating a specific crime [of domestic 
violence, then the Criminal Code] will recognize the unique circumstances that 
domestic violence presents.  Domestic violence is usually not an isolated incident; 
it is a pattern of incidents.”87  Pragmatically, Cummings continued, “[i]nstead of 
having to prosecute domestic violence only through existing crimes like assault or 
criminal threatening [the new crime of domestic violence] will give prosecutors a 
defined tool that recognizes the pattern.”88 
Also submitted to the Joint Standing Committee on Criminal Justice and 
Public Safety were comments from an “i-petition,” in which respondents from 
across the state were able to share their views about the need for L.D. 1627.89  
According to one response, “We can never reach our full potential in our fight 
against domestic violence until all agencies involved recognize the cyclical, 
patterned process that abuse follows.  Perpetrators will not be held fully 
accountable until this legislation is passed and enforced.”90  Another commentator 
remarked, “I strongly support LD 1627 to help put teeth into criminalizing abuse 
and violence in Maine.”91 
Former Co-Chair of the Maine Coalition to End Domestic Violence Lois 
Galgay Reckitt speaking on behalf of the nine member projects of the coalition, 
testified that “[t]he victims of domestic abuse are trapped and persecuted in a 
repeating pattern—that our existing criminal justice methodology—dealing with 
crime in an ‘incident-based’ way would never fully touch.”92  Moreover, Reckitt 
encouraged the Maine Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety to send the 
bill, as written, to the Legislature floor with “a unanimous ought to pass.”93 
Anne Jordan, Commissioner of the Maine Department of Public Safety, also 
supported the bill as originally written.94  She explained that under the current law, 
“[W]hen a person is prosecuted and convicted for abusing a household or family 
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member, the resulting conviction is for a crime such as, for example, assault, 
terrorizing, or stalking.  Undoubtedly a conviction for any one of those crimes is a 
serious matter; however, the elements—and even names—of the crimes fail to 
appreciate or convey the context in which the crimes were committed.”95  L.D. 
1627, testified Jordan, would “ensure that Maine’s statutes not only address 
criminal conduct in itself, but also criminal conduct that is committed as part of a 
destructive, and all too often lethal, pattern of conduct.”96  In addition, Jordan 
predicted that the benefits of passing L.D. 1627 as written would lie in permitting 
law enforcement officers “to better appreciate and enforce the laws, allow them to 
better track violators and assist in the review and processing of weapons requests 
and restrictions under the Federal Violence Against Women Act.”97  Jordan further 
testified that members of the Maine Prosecutors Association relayed to her that 
their work in “combat[ting] the horrors of domestic violence” would be facilitated 
by criminalizing domestic violence.98   
Domestic violence survivor and advocate Donna Melanson also submitted 
testimony in support of L.D. 1627.  Melanson alleged that she was also a victim of 
the state’s “present judicial system . . . . [b]ecause our system fails to acknowledge 
the abuser’s history of domestic violence.”99  As part of her stirring testimony, 
Melanson added that “each court case [involving domestic violence] is processed 
as [an] isolated incident.  And when we fail to recognize the pattern of domestic 
violence as a crime, it changes the way people perceive abuse when it occurs in 
intimate relationships.”100  Melanson wrote, “No one can truly understand the 
complexity of domestic violence until they live it.”101  This complexity, she 
asserted, is not reflected in the narrow way in which incidents of domestic violence 
are charged and prosecuted in the state.102   
The only recorded dissention against L.D. 1627 came from the Maine 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (MACDL), who argued that domestic 
violence was already classified as a crime in Maine and treated “very seriously” by 
Maine judges, making this proposal superfluous.103  MACDL focused on the 
portion of the bill that would allow for violations of protection from abuse orders to 
be a predicate offense to raise the crime classification level to a felony.104  
According to MACDL President Walter F. McKee, “Judges are not clamoring at 
this time for any more significant opportunities to provide additional jail time for 
defendants convicted of assault on family members.”105  Despite this criticism, the 
bill rode into committee on a wave of overwhelming support. 
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B.  The Story Behind the Changes 
The legislative intent behind L.D. 1627 was clear: to categorize domestic 
violence as a course of conduct crime, thereby recognizing a wide variety of 
abusive behavior under its provisions.  Such a classification would have allowed 
past abusive behavior—broadly construed—to come to light during trial, as this 
behavior would be used to prove that the defendant had, in fact, committed 
“domestic violence.” 
The bill, and the attendant hearings about L.D. 1627, generated much popular 
support, as evidenced by statewide media coverage of the bill.  Former Portland 
Press Herald Editor Jeannine Guttman remarked, 
LD 1627 . . . takes an aggressive stance.  A series of malevolent phone calls or an 
assault on a family member would no longer be prosecuted as just criminal 
threatening or assault—they would also be legally considered as “domestic 
violence.”  Under the bill, those convicted of DV crimes would have a record that 
better indicates a criminal history that too often represents a pattern of abusive 
behavior.106 
According to Glenn Adams of the Associated Press, “The bill’s prospects appear 
good, given its co-sponsorship by nearly half of the Legislature and presiding 
officers of the House and Senate.”107  Donna Baietti, executive director of the 
Battered Women’s Project in Aroostook County, remarked that the bill would 
allow law enforcement to “look at what’s really happening in that household, in 
that relationship.  It also allows for the crime to address the patterns of behaviors, 
abusive behaviors or violent behaviors that are present in abusive relationships.”108  
Between the public hearing and the eventual adoption of the bill, however, the 
thrust of L.D. 1627 was greatly diminished.   
The Criminal Law Advisory Commission’s (CLAC), comprised of nine non-
Legislative members appointed by the state attorney general,109 recommendations 
changed the bill significantly, functionally gutting it of its intended evidentiary 
import and conceptual foundations.  “Regarding the structure of the proposed [L.D. 
1627],” the committee wrote, “CLAC believes that the ‘catch-all’ nature of the 
section as currently drafted is inconsistent with the prevailing structure of the 
Criminal Code.”110  According to CLAC, the Maine Legislature had revised the 
structure of the criminal code so that each crime was given a specific statutory 
citation.111  CLAC argued that the revisions helped an “ongoing computerization 
effort, but also had the effect of allowing people to determine the exact nature of 
the conduct the defendant engaged in from the caption and citation of a charge.”112   
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CLAC further argued that if the bill was enacted as written, an observer 
looking at the conviction would not know the particular crime the defendant 
committed without looking at the actual court file.113  In order to alleviate these 
concerns, CLAC made a recommendation that completely changed the tenor and 
power of the bill.  CLAC recommended that rather than adopt L.D. 1627 (or, as it 
was proposed, M.R.S.A. section 214) as written, that the bill be amended to create, 
for example, a crime of “domestic violence assault” in one section, and a crime of 
“domestic violence criminal threatening” in another.114  “While making the 
Criminal Code more voluminous, this approach would enhance the goals of 
precision and clarity with respect to future convictions under these provisions,” 
CLAC’s members contended.115 
Ultimately, L.D. 1627 as amended passed unanimously, with the amendments 
suggested by CLAC and adopted by the Maine Senate and House.116  As a result, 
the following laws were enacted on June 27, 2007, and became effective on 
February 1, 2008: 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207-A Domestic Violence Assault;117 17-A 
M.R.S.A. § 209-A Domestic Violence Criminal Threatening;118  17-A M.R.S.A. § 
210-B Domestic Violence Terrorizing;119 17-A M.R.S.A. § 210-C Domestic 
Violence Stalking;120 and 17-A M.R.S.A. § 211-A Domestic Violence Reckless 
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Id. § 210. 
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Conduct.121  The state’s prosecutors now are bringing charges under the new 
laws.122  
C.  What Are the Effects of These New Laws? 
All these new laws make the domestic violence offenses Class D crimes for 
first-time offenders and Class C crimes for repeat offenders.123  The effect of the 
new laws in helping to address Maine’s domestic violence crisis has yet to be seen.  
However, the enacted criminal laws, the new “domestic violence” crimes, have 
eviscerated the intent of and potential benefits that would have grown from 
adoption of L.D. 1627 as originally conceived.  By refusing to classify domestic 
violence as a “course of conduct” crime, CLAC effectively knocked the legs out 
from under the original law.  The Maine Legislature, which was largely unaware of 
the severity of these changes, passed scarecrow legislation.   
If the language of the original bill had been retained, all evidence about the 
battering relationship would have been admissible, under State v. Friel.124  The 
Law Court there held that where it is “an element of the offense the evidence of the 
prior [acts] was highly relevant and not excludable under any rule.”125  Since 
evidence of the course of conduct aspect of domestic violence has been eliminated 
as an integral element of the charge, such prior acts are not automatically 
admissible.  Therefore, the prosecutor generally cannot introduce such evidence in 
her case-in-chief. 
Domestic violence is best understood as a cluster of crimes, and the original 
construction of the law would have allowed prosecutors to present evidence of a 
variety of illegal acts under the label “domestic violence.”  However, the laws as 
they now stand focus, once again, on discrete acts, divorced from the context of the 
battering relationship.  Without the ability to introduce evidence of “prior acts,” 
these new domestic violence laws lose their bite and intended effect.  Sentencing 
will be enhanced for repeat offenders who are prosecuted successfully, but the 
evidence of these prior acts will never be presented to the jury for consideration.  
The ultimate goals of “holding batterers accountable” and “recognizing domestic 
violence as a course of conduct crime” will not be realized by the law as it 
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currently exists. 
V. MAINE RULE OF EVIDENCE 404 
A.  Exceptions Articulated by Rule 404(b) 
According to Maine’s Rule of Evidence 401, “relevant evidence” is defined as 
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence.”126  Additionally, all relevant evidence is deemed 
admissible unless prohibited by another rule of evidence or by the Maine or federal 
Constitution.127  The Law Court reinforced this principle in 2006, holding in State 
v. Allen that “[a]ll facts which tend to prove or disprove the matter at issue or 
which constitute a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence with respect to the 
act charged are relevant and should be admissible into evidence within judicial 
discretion unless excluded by some rule or principle of law.”128  Furthermore, under 
Maine law, trial court judges have “broad discretion to determine whether proffered 
evidence is relevant.”129 
Admitting prior acts evidence on non-character theories has proven nearly 
impossible for the state’s prosecutors in domestic-violence-related non-homicide 
prosecutions.  Judges are hesitant to admit such evidence, even if prosecutors 
present clearly articulated exceptions to the general prohibition against prior acts 
evidence.  The barrier that prosecutors face is Maine Rule of Evidence 404 (“Rule 
404”), which presents a general ban on character-based evidence.130  In particular, 
Rule 404(b) places an express ban on prior acts evidence being used to prove action 
“in conformity” with a defendant’s character, with a few delineated exceptions.131  
According to the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 404, “This rule is not based on 
lack of relevancy but rather because the danger of prejudice (‘he’s a bad man, so he 
is probably guilty’) outweighs the probative value.”132  The Advisory  Committee 
also determined that Rule 404(b) “does not exclude the evidence [of prior acts] 
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”133 
These exceptions “do not reflect the realities of domestic violence,”134 which 
encompasses a wide range of violent and controlling acts.  The non-character 
permissible uses under Rule 404(b) require factual similarity to a degree that does 
not arise from most domestic violence situations.  For example, for a prior act to be 
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admissible under the theory of intent, the mental state of the defendant must be in 
dispute and the prior act and the prosecuted act must be sufficiently similar to 
support the inference that “the defendant probably harbor[ed] the same intent in 
each instance.”135  Although acts of domestic violence are generally part of the 
same cycle to gain power and control over the batterer’s victim, they do not often 
share a degree of similarity sufficient to satisfy admissibility under the theory of 
intent.  Additionally, the identity exception, along with most of the other 
exceptions under Rule 404(b), is not of particular value in domestic violence 
prosecutions, as the identity of the perpetrator, as well as his motive, is generally 
not an issue in dispute. 
Another stumbling block that prosecutors face when attempting to persuade 
judges to admit prior acts under non-character theories is the requisite Rule 403 
“balancing test.”136  In the off chance that a judge would consider admitting 
evidence of a prior act of domestic violence, she must weigh the probative effect of 
such evidence against its potential of prejudicing the jury against the defendant.  If 
the risk of prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value, the evidence may 
be excluded under Rule 403.  In performing this balancing test, the court takes into 
consideration the need for the evidence, alternative methods of proof, and 
remoteness in time to the action being prosecuted.137  Although such trial court 
Rule 403 determinations will be reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion,138 
the Rule 403 hurdle at the trial level is difficult to clear.  In domestic violence 
cases, because of the highly prejudicial nature of prior acts evidence, such evidence 
tends to be excluded, even if it surmounts the Rule 404(b) exclusionary barrier.  
Accordingly, “[b]ecause of the accessibility of propensity inferences from evidence 
of prior acts, evidence of either acts which resemble the act in question or acts 
which carry with them overall negative connotations calls for the court to exercise 
special caution in admitting such evidence even for limited purposes under general 
rubrics, such as intent, motive and relationship.”139  In addition, the Law Court’s  
policy on the rules of evidence, is that if there is any doubt regarding the 
admissibility of evidence, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
defendant.140  The general trend, therefore, is to exclude even highly relevant 
evidence of prior acts if it risks prejudicing the jury against the defendant for the 
particular crime charged.   
Appellate courts in all states remain fearful of other crimes’ evidence and continue 
to impose a number of substantive and procedural restrictions on its admission.  
Restrictions are particularly placed on the trial courts’ role in making the 
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preliminary determination of admissibility and in instructing the jury as to the 
appropriate use of the evidence.141 
As a result, courts seem to err on the side of caution and refuse to admit prior acts 
evidence in a close call situation, or, in most domestic violence prosecutions, refuse 
to admit such evidence at all. 
B.  Maine “Prior Acts” Jurisprudence from the 1800s to the Present 
The oftentimes conflicting history of Maine’s Rule 404(b) jurisprudence has 
left many prosecutors feeling as though they cannot introduce prior acts evidence in 
domestic violence prosecutions at all.  As derived from the common law, first 
articulated in State v. Tozier,142 in 1862, Rule 404(b) stands for the proposition that 
the state in a criminal action cannot introduce in its case-in-chief evidence of the 
“bad character” of the accused.143  The rule, the holding explains, is not based on 
irrelevancy but rather is a safeguard against the danger of prejudice outweighing 
the evidence’s probative value.144  This jurisprudence has had a disproportionate 
impact on domestic violence prosecutions in the state, as “the cycles of violence 
and the power dynamics in abusive relationships dramatically affect the quality and 
quantity, as well as the type of evidence available in domestic violence cases.”145 
In State v. Pike,146 a 1876 case before the Law Court, in which a husband was 
found guilty for the killing of his wife, Margaret, “by seizing and dragging her by 
the hair of her head, and throwing her with force and violence upon a sofa, giving 
her mortal wounds, of which she died,” the court held that evidence of other acts of 
abuse during the night in question were properly admitted during Pike’s trial.147  
However, the court noted, “[I]t is undoubtedly true . . . that neither proof of another 
distinct felony, nor proof of another distinct assault upon [Margaret] was 
admissible.”148  The evidence in this case, the court reasoned, was “not of that 
description.  It was limited to acts of violence on the same evening, and only a 
short time before [Margaret’s] death.”149  The temporal element between the 
particularized “incidents” of the crime was dispositive:  As the events were so close 
in time, the court construed them to be part of the same event, namely, the eventual 
killing of Margaret Pike.  The court stated quite clearly, however, that if the 
incidents were “distinct assaults,” apart from the night in question, the court would 
not admit such evidence.150   
In the 1951 case of State v. Hume,151 a larceny prosecution, the Law Court 
decided that “[r]elevant evidence to support a charge may be received within the 
court’s discretion although it may tend to show that the respondent committed 
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another offense not charged or that the acts charged are part of a common 
scheme.”152  While this holding sounds promising in leaving open the possibility 
that judicial discretion alone could determine the admissibility of uncharged acts in 
a prosecution, upon closer inspection, the court focused on the fact that the 
evidence was introduced by the defendant’s attorney, as opposed to the state 
prosecutor.153 However, the effect of the court’s holding is procedural, not 
substantive.  According to the court, the analysis of admissibility would change 
drastically if the prosecutor had attempted to introduce the evidence of the prior act 
in his case-in-chief.154 
Nearly two decades later, the Law Court proclaimed that “[e]vidence that is 
otherwise competent and relevant to prove a [d]efendant’s guilt of the particular 
crime charged is not made inadmissible by the fact that it also, but incidentally, 
tends to prove him guilty of another distinct crime.”155  Also in 1971, the court 
decided, in State v. Smith: 
Where the acts showing the commission of the substantive offense of the crime 
against nature were all so closely related in point of time and place and so 
intimately associated with the acts evidencing the offense charged that they 
formed together a continuous transactional episode, the whole event could be 
shown, including what immediately preceded and what immediately followed the 
act complained of, for the purpose of showing the intent of the accused.156 
The close temporal proximity of events in the court’s 1973 decision in State v. 
Eaton157 proved to be the fulcrum upon which the court’s reasoning turned in 
admitting prior acts, seemingly unrelated, into a prosecution for assault with a 
dangerous weapon with intent to kill.158  The defendant contended that the trial 
judge committed reversible error when he admitted into evidence “numerous 
threats made by [the defendant] to a number of persons other than [the victim].”159  
According to the court, “Where the intent of a party is an ingredient of the crime 
charged, evidence of conduct of a similar nature may be introduced to establish the 
intent of the defendant . . . .”160  The court continued to explain, “The previous 
threats and assaults in the instant case were part of a single set of circumstances, 
closely related in nature and time, all linked together by a common purpose . . . 
.”161  Because the court could not tease out the ultimate crime from the context in 
which it was committed, it decided to admit all evidence of the night’s events. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Law Court reiterated its commitment to 
the general prohibition provided by Rule 404(b): evidence of prior bad acts is not 
admissible against a criminal defendant if its sole purpose and relevance is to 
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demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes.162  However, in a 1982 
murder prosecution,163 the Law Court held that the trial judge properly admitted 
evidence of a defendant’s prior beating of his victim and chasing of the victim with 
a knife, in order to allow the prosecution to demonstrate that the defendant 
committed the murder knowingly or intentionally.164  As the court’s reasoning has 
rarely been replicated in domestic violence prosecution appeals since, it is useful to 
read that portion of the court’s decision in full: 
Over defense objection, the court allowed a prosecution witness to testify that in 
the summer of 1979 she once heard Valentine beat Tripp for an hour.  The witness 
testified that during the beating Valentine would stop to smoke or fix a drink and 
then continue hitting Tripp.  Following this incident, Valentine said: “She was 
damn lucky I wasn’t wearing my knife.  I reached for it and it was gone.”  Another 
witness, again over objection, testified that on June 30, 1980, Valentine, who was 
apparently intoxicated, chased Tripp up a street with a knife.  After Tripp escaped, 
Valentine gave the knife to the witness and said: “I was going to kill the bitch.”  
Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to prove that a defendant acted on a 
particular occasion in conformity with his past behavior. . . . When such conduct 
was directed at the victim of the crime the evidence may be admissible, however, 
to prove motive or intent. . . .  Here, the State initially sought to prove Valentine’s 
conduct was knowing or intentional.  Accordingly, intent was in issue at trial and 
the evidence was properly admitted.165 
Here, not only was the time lapse between these two beatings and the ultimate 
murder of the victim significant (from more than a year to a few months before the 
murder itself), the court allowed the evidence of the beatings in with no more 
corroboration than the witnesses’ sworn testimony.166  The courts, both the Law 
Court and the trial court, relied on the articulated exceptions under Rule 404(b) to 
admit the probative evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of abuse.167 
Additionally, in 1984, the Law Court clarified its State v. Bourgeois168 decision 
that the main issue “is whether there is some sort of  logical or experiential ‘nexus’ 
between the prior acts and the act charged other than a general propensity on the 
part of the defendant to commit such acts.”169  In Bourgeois, evidence of the 
defendant’s violent acts against his former wife were not admissible in a 
prosecution concerning the attempted murder of his current wife.170  Though in 
child sexual abuse prosecutions (see below) the court will uphold the admission of 
evidence of prior acts between the defendant and a third party, in domestic violence 
and other prosecutions, the evidentiary nexus has been held to be insufficient. 
The Law Court held in 1988 in State v. Hezick171 that the trial court’s 
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“exclusion of evidence about a separate protection-from-abuse proceeding against 
[the defendant] fell well within the scope of the presiding justice’s discretion to 
assess relevancy of proffered evidence.”172  In the 1991 Law Court decision of 
State v. Nile,173 the court decided that evidence of prior acts against a victim could 
be admissible for the limited purpose of allowing the jury to consider the victim’s 
“state of mind at the time these alleged events were happening . . . .”174  The 
defendant in this case was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated assault, and witness 
tampering in a prosecution for crimes he committed against his estranged wife.175  
The court argued that the victim’s state of mind was relevant in proving that she 
was threatened and coerced into the defendant’s car, and that the evidence of his 
prior abuse of her was introduced “for the very limited purpose” of demonstrating 
her state of mind.176  That same year the Law Court also decided that evidence of 
other wrongful acts could be admissible to demonstrate that a defendant had the 
requisite intent to harass the subject of a protection from harassment order.177  
In an arson prosecution in 1992, the court expanded the bounds of what 
“relationship” meant in order to admit prior acts of vandalism. 178  Drawing upon its 
1989 decision in State v. Giovanini,179 the Law Court decided that “the vandalism 
evidence was probative on the crucial issue of the perpetrator of the arson, and was 
admitted on that issue to show the relationship between [the defendant] and [the 
victim] and that [the defendant] had a motive to burn [the victim’s] home.”180  The 
court decided that a vandalism on the victim’s car two weeks before the arson 
established a relationship between the accused and the victim.181  The court seemed 
to rely on the temporal proximity between the two acts, rather than the substantial 
similarity between the acts, to uphold the evidence’s admissibility.   
A 1993 domestic-violence-based prosecution for attempted murder and 
aggravated assault and its subsequent convictions were upheld by the Law Court.  
In State v. Shuman,182 the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant’s threats 
against his wife and children, even though his violent act was directed at another 
man.  “Similar threats or acts against others are relevant if there is a sufficient 
nexus between the evidence sought to be introduced and the elements of the crime 
charged,” wrote the court.183  The court added that the threat of undue prejudice 
was “ameliorated by the lack of evidence that [the defendant] made any effort to 
carry out his threat to his wife, the evidence of his later, non-threatening 
conversation with his wife, and the time lag between the statement and the assault 
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on [the victim.]”184  Domestic abuse evidence was, therefore, admitted in a 
connected, but non-domestic-violence-specific prosecution. 
However, in 1997, the court held in State v. Jordan that the trial court 
committed reversible error when it allowed testimony about harassing phone calls 
from the defendant to his estranged wife.185  The trial court allowed a witness to 
testify “in detail that [the defendant] had made fifteen or twenty harassing phone 
calls, that he had followed her in a vehicle and nearly ran her off the road, and that 
he had stalked her.”186  However, the current case against the defendant did not 
involve his estranged wife directly, as he was convicted of reckless conduct with 
the use of a firearm against a police officer.187  “[T]he evidence of [the defendant’s] 
prior bad acts directed against his wife had no probative value in proving his guilt 
of the later crime committed against someone else and, therefore, the court erred in 
admitting [his estranged wife’s] testimony,” wrote the court.188   
In a more recent decision, the Law Court upheld the murder conviction of a 
defendant over his objection that prior acts evidence concerning an incident of 
domestic violence was improperly admitted at his trial.189  The court reasoned: 
At trial, the prosecution claimed that the killing of [the victim] was intentional.  
The testimony that [the defendant] had previously engaged in an act of domestic 
violence toward [the victim] by kicking in the locked front door of their home 
causing the door to strike her in the head, was offered to prove the absence of 
mistake or accident as to the murder and is, therefore, admissible under Rule 
404(b).  Further, the trial court acted within its discretion in applying Rule 403 and 
concluding that this evidence was not so prejudicial as to substantially outweigh its 
probative value.190 
This decision seems to align itself with other evidence rulings in murder 
prosecutions.  Because the probative value of the evidence in a murder prosecution 
will rarely be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, evidence of prior 
acts—under a recognized and well-articulated Rule 404(b) exception—will often 
be admitted.  In lesser crimes, however, the potential prejudicial effect of such 
evidence increases, whereas the “need” for the evidence decreases, resulting in 
judges being much more willing to exclude any prior acts evidence from the 
purview of the jury. 
Most recently, in State v. Dilley, the Law Court upheld the manslaughter 
convictions  of Jon Dilley, who killed his mother and estranged wife.191  On appeal, 
Dilley alleged that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning statements 
he made to a co-worker about killing his wife.192  The court stated: “In criminal 
trials involving an intent element, we have repeatedly held that evidence of the 
prior relationship between the accused and the victim is relevant and admissible to 
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establish the accused’s motive, intent, or opportunity to commit the crime, or to 
demonstrate the absence of any mistake or accident.”193  The court continued: “If 
the evidence regarding the accused’s relationship to the victim concerns events that 
arose a significant amount of time before the crime, that remoteness in time 
generally goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence.”194  If the 
prosecution, as was done in Dilley, presents evidence of prior acts relating to the 
intent element of the crime charged, the Law Court consistently holds that such 
acts—at least in homicide prosecutions—are admissible over Rule 404 and Rule 
403 objections. 
The Law Court’s jurisprudence of the admissibility of prior acts is largely 
dependent upon the type of prosecution in which the evidence is being offered.  
Generally, in homicide prosecutions, because the risk of prejudice is diminished, at 
least theoretically, by the enormity of the crime alleged, judges do not hesitate to 
admit a wide variety of prior acts evidence under articulated Rule 404(b) 
exceptions. 
C.  Evidence Rulings in the Sexual Assault and Child Sexual Abuse Contexts 
Whereas Maine’s lower courts and the Law Court have been hesitant to allow 
the admission of prior acts evidence, there is one context in which the courts have 
been consistent: the admission of prior acts evidence in sexual assault and child 
sexual abuse cases.  Though there is no official rule regarding admissibility in these 
types of prosecutions—unlike in federal law, in which the Federal Rules of 
Evidence 413, 414, and 415 explicitly allow for the admissibility of prior 
convictions and uncharged acts in sex crimes195—the state courts have admitted 
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such evidence largely under the “relationship” or “intent” exceptions in Rule 
404(b).  The Law Court has affirmed, in several instances, the admission of 
evidence of prior acts to demonstrate the existence of a “relationship” between the 
accused and the victim.  
According to the authors of Maine’s treatise on evidence:  
The rubric of “relationship” can be extended to allow the admission of a wide 
range of evidence that otherwise would be barred by [Rule 404(b)].  The theory is 
that the prior conduct supports inferences of the existence of a relationship 
between the actor and some other person that is relevant either to an issue in the 
case or the credibility of a witness.196  
The authors also seem skeptical that “[a]lthough the evidence was ostensibly 
offered and admitted to show the defendant’s ‘intent’ or the ‘relationship’ between 
the parties, those issues do not appear to have been of actual importance in the 
cases.”197  Even accompanied by limiting instructions as to the relevance of such 
prior acts evidence, the authors question the propriety of the admission of the 
evidence as “its real probative force seems quite close to the inference that the 
defendant acted in conformity with those past actions on the occasion(s) in question 
at trial—precisely the inference Rule 404 is intended to block.”198 
In the 1958 decision State v. Seaburg,199 the Law Court announced that it had 
“held that in an indecent liberties prosecution proof of prior acts of a nature similar 
to the principal offense charged in the indictment is admissible.”200  In Seaburg, the 
trial judge allowed testimony about games of strip poker between the victim and 
the defendant as relevant to explain their relationship.201  In its 1986 decision State 
v. Adams,202 the Law Court held that evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual 
misconduct over a six-year period was admissible to show motive, intent, or 
opportunity in the present crime and was not overly prejudicial to force its 
exclusion.203  Similarly, in State v. Ouellette,204 the Law Court held that, in a 
prosecution for sexual misconduct, it was not abuse of discretion to permit the 
prosecution “to elicit testimony concerning sexual episodes between [the 
defendant] and the victim that were not charged in the indictment in order to show 
the relationship between them.”205  In its 1992 State v. Smith206 decision, the Law 
Court upheld the admission of the victim’s testimony concerning prior acts of 
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violence against her on the ground that such evidence went to the issue of 
compulsion in a gross sexual assault case.207  The Law Court further held that the 
prosecutors were allowed to demonstrate through this evidence that the victim had 
submitted out of fear based on these prior incidents.208  Because the details of the 
prior incidents were vague, the Law Court found that this minimized the potential 
prejudicial effect under Rule 403.209 
In an even greater stretch of the bounds of the Rule 404(b) exceptions, in State 
v. Thompson,210  the Law Court upheld the trial court’s decision to allow evidence 
of the defendant’s prior bad acts involving only one of two sex-offense victims to 
be used in charges involving only the other victim.211  Thus, prior uncharged acts 
against another person were deemed admissible for the prosecution of an offense 
not involving that particular victim.  In a recent case involving a juvenile sex 
offender, the Law Court upheld the admission of evidence of “[p]ast, uncharged 
acts between a defendant and complainant [as admissible to demonstrate the] 
defendant’s intent to commit the crime with which he is charged.”212  These two 
cases highlight the general trend of the Law Court to allow prior acts evidence in 
sexual assault prosecutions if introduced under the “relationship” exception of Rule 
404(b). 
However, in a child sexual abuse prosecution, State v. Palmer,213 the Law 
Court held that evidence of prior acts cannot be admitted solely as “background 
information.”214  Notably, it was evidence of past physical abuse of the victim’s 
mother that was, in the opinion of the court, improperly admitted.215  The mother 
had testified at trial that while she was in the process of divorcing the defendant, 
she had, along with her children, spent time in an abused women’s shelter.216  The 
Law Court reasoned that “[a]lthough evidence about other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
of a defendant may be admitted . . . , it is not admissible as background 
information.”217  The effect of this information was not considered to be harmless, 
and thus the court vacated the judgment against the defendant.218  The net that the 
Law Court has cast for the admissibility of prior acts in sexual assault prosecutions 
is wide.  However, the Law Court has foreclosed as a possibility attempts to admit 
the defendant’s prior acts against third parties as a part of the prosecutor’s case-in-
chief. 
Within the realm of sexual abuse prosecutions, particularly if there is a child 
involved, the Law Court has demonstrated its willingness to expand the bounds of 
admissible prior acts evidence as demonstrated by the preceding cases.  There is an 
important lesson to learn from this: Establishing a “relationship” between the 
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accused and his victim is an important exception to the general ban against prior 
acts evidence by Rule 404(b).  Crimes involving sexual abuse are different, the 
Law Court seems to acknowledge, and thus, in such sexually-based prosecutions, 
the court adheres to a broad admissibility of prior acts evidence standard. 
D.  Maine Prosecutors’ View of “Prior Acts” Admissibility 
While the Law Court is the ultimate authority as to whether and when prior 
acts evidence may be admissible against a criminal defendant, it is the state’s 
prosecutors who most acutely feel the effects of the trial courts’ decisions regarding 
evidence admissibility.  And while the Law Court decisions represent only the 
smallest slice of criminal cases in the state, it is the district attorneys who can 
provide the most complete picture of how evidence admissibility affects their 
prosecution of domestic-violence-related crimes.  District attorneys from across the 
state completed an Author-generated survey in the fall of 2008 in which they were 
asked to detail their views on the admissibility of prior acts evidence in domestic-
violence-related prosecutions.219  Their answers, despite experience and geographic 
differences, were rather uniform. 
The prosecutor survey respondents all commented that they rarely, if ever, 
attempt to introduce prior acts evidence in a domestic violence prosecution.  
Deputy District Attorney for Aroostook County Carrie L. Linthicum remarked, “In 
cases where the defendant has a prior similar offense, which is a lot of the cases, 
not one of our judges (two District Court and one Superior Court) will allow 
evidence of prior assault or similar convictions to be entered into evidence.”220  
Assistant District Attorney Todd Collins remarked that while such acts are relevant 
and used at sentencing, they are “generally inadmissible” in his experience at 
trial.221  Three assistant district attorneys from Penobscot County remarked that 
admitting prior acts of domestic violence under the Maine Rules of Evidence would 
be “impermissible.”222  Assistant District Attorney Katherine Tierney, a prosecutor 
in the Domestic Violence Unit in Cumberland County, remarked that while prior 
acts could be admissible for the limited purpose of demonstrating the victim’s 
sense of fear in a terrorizing, threatening, or stalking prosecution, they are excluded 
generally from other types of domestic-violence-related prosecutions.223  The end 
result, these prosecutors agree, is that despite some favorable case law, they do not 
attempt to introduce prior acts evidence in the vast majority, if not all, of their 
domestic violence prosecutions for fear of exclusion, wasting time, or, according to 
one prosecutor, making the judge angry, which will not help the prosecution’s 
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case.224 
The prosecutors similarly agreed that uncooperative victims are the single-
most insurmountable barrier to successful convictions in domestic violence cases.  
Linthicum remarked, “The admissibility of priors is the least of our concerns since 
we know they won’t be admitted.”225  However, according to A.D.A. Tierney, 
allowing the jury to hear evidence of prior acts of violence against the victim could 
go a long way in helping the jury understand the context of the relationship and 
why the victim is not testifying on her own behalf. 226  “We need to have these prior 
acts in order to show why [the victim] would be scared of retaliation by the 
defendant,” said Tierney.227  She added that prosecutors, if allowed to, should use 
their discretion in deciding which prior acts of abuse should be admitted during 
trial.  “These acts would be used to show a course of conduct of putting the victim 
in fear,” said Tierney.  “You wouldn’t need ten years of atrocities to accomplish 
that.”228  Tierney said that while she is bringing charges under the new domestic 
violence laws of the criminal code, these crimes have not made admitting evidence 
about prior acts of domestic violence easier.  “There’s tons of abuse,” she said.229 
Particularly in “no-drop” or “evidenced-based” prosecutorial districts,230 of 
which Cumberland County is officially and Aroostook County is in practice, the 
admissibility of prior acts evidence could increase the success rates of prosecution 
dramatically.  Tierney remarked that,  “After Davis, getting excited utterances and 
other hearsay-type evidence admitted when the victim is not there to testify has 
gotten even harder.  We are limited as to what we can do without more evidence, 
given the victim’s unavailability.”231  Linthicum remarked that the end result of 
victim recantation is that the office will “opt for deferred dispositions or long 
continuances for the defendant to engage in counseling in hopes that he will not 
repeat the behavior.  Sometimes the magic works, sometimes it doesn’t.”232  In a 
prosecution district like Penobscot County, where there is not a “no-drop” domestic 
violence prosecution policy in place, prosecutors cannot bring charges against the 
defendant if the victim recants or there is no corroborating evidence to support the 
charge itself.233  According to one assistant district attorney, this can result in 
dropping a more serious charge—assault, threatening, reckless conduct—to 
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor that rarely results in any jail time.234 
In essence, prosecutors are being prevented from successfully and fully 
prosecuting domestic violence defendants because their evidence base may not be 
enough to prove the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rule 404(b), in 
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their opinions, has provided a systematic and often insurmountable barrier to 
presenting relevant, probative evidence of the battering relationship to the jury.  
According to Tierney, the A.D.A. knows about the defendant’s history; the judge 
knows about the history; it affects what prosecutors charge and how judges 
sentence.  But the jury can never hear of it.235  The arguably most important actors 
in the criminal justice process, the jury members, are deprived of having a more 
complete and accurate picture of the domestic violence course of conduct through 
the overly draconian utilization of Rule 404(b) to exclude evidence of prior acts. 
In the domestic violence context, prosecutors must make the preliminary 
decision concerning the charge they seek against a particular offender.  They must 
take into account several factors, the most important of which is usually the 
strength of the evidence against the defendant for the crime charged.  If prosecutors 
were confident that the evidence of prior acts of domestic violence would be 
admissible to show the relationship between the defendant and his victim, they 
would be more confident in bringing charges, even without victim testimony: a 
classic barrier to successful domestic violence prosecutions.  Maine’s prosecutors 
have responded overwhelmingly that, given their knowledge of local judges’ 
tendencies in ruling against the admission of prior acts evidence, they have decided 
not to attempt to introduce such evidence in the majority of situations.  In domestic 
violence prosecutions, this can prove fatal to the prosecution itself.  Furthermore, 
as the prosecutors have no ability to appeal the evidence admissibility decision of 
the individual judge if the case ends in a plea or acquittal, the improper judicial 
decision to exclude the evidence will never be reviewed.  Ultimately, the Law 
Court’s confusing jurisprudence on the admissibility of prior acts is wreaking 
havoc on the ground: Prosecutors are not attempting to introduce prior acts 
evidence, even with well-articulated (and non-exhaustive) exceptions under Rule 
404(b).  As a result, valuable evidence will never be presented to the jury, and, 
perhaps more importantly given the rise of plea bargaining in the criminal justice 
system, cannot be used as a bargaining chip during the course of plea negotiations 
in having defendants plead to more appropriate charges for their domestic violence-
related conduct.  More fundamentally, the particularized “frozen in time” discrete 
instances of domestic violence that are currently being prosecuted are devoid of 
context and lose much of their narrative power because they are presented divorced 
from the relationship from which they emerge.  The new criminal law code 
amendments have done nothing to address this problem. 
E.  Has the Law Court Provided a Pathway to Admissibility? 
Through its jurisprudence concerning Rule 404(b), the Law Court has proven 
itself conflicted over the issue of prior acts evidence admissibility, to say the least.  
In many instances, the court has upheld the conviction of criminal defendants 
against whom evidence of prior acts was admitted at trial.  It has done so for 
different reasons: the articulated exception to Rule 404(b) was recognized as valid; 
the evidence itself was not so prejudicial as to substantially outweigh its probative 
value under Rule 403; admitting such evidence was not “clear error” by the trial 
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court; or the error stemming from the evidence’s admission was “harmless.”  In 
many other instances, however, the Law Court has held that admission of prior acts 
evidence was too prejudicial to be admitted, or did not fit neatly into a clearly 
delineated exception to the general ban against prior acts evidence.  Oftentimes, it 
appears that the court’s decision-making as to the propriety of the trial court’s 
decision to admit prior acts evidence has been determined by the severity and type 
of crime charged.  In homicide prosecutions, the court has proven itself much more 
amenable to the admission of even inflammatory prejudicial prior acts evidence.  
Additionally, in sexual abuse prosecutions, trial judge discretion largely remains 
untouched by the Law Court in admitting a wide variety of prior acts evidence 
under the rubric of “relationship” or “intent.” 
This has led to a contradictory and confusing state of affairs, and has made 
prosecutors unsure about when and whether to attempt to introduce prior acts 
evidence at trial.  The Law Court needs to provide clarity to prosecutors and, 
perhaps more importantly, to the Maine District and Superior Court judges and 
justices who confront these issues of admissibility daily.  Within the realm of 
domestic violence prosecutions, clarity could mean the difference between a 
dropped charge and an adjudication or a finding of “not guilty” and a conviction.  
The stakes are remarkably high when it comes to domestic violence prior acts 
admissibility.  The Law Court  has a tremendous opportunity to amend the Maine 
Rules of Evidence to allow explicitly for the introduction of prior acts evidence in 
domestic violence prosecutions when those prior acts elucidate the relationship 
between the defendant and his victim as well as the context of battering from which 
the charges stem. 
VI. AMENDING MAINE’S RULES OF EVIDENCE TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN 
CHARGING AND SENTENCING IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS 
Though several state legislatures have adopted statutory changes to their rules 
of evidence to allow for prior acts of domestic violence to be admissible in criminal 
prosecutions, these statutory schemes focus on the “propensity” of batterers to 
commit acts of domestic violence.236  The proponents of such statutes argue largely 
by analogy—batterers are like sexual offenders.  They act by compulsion, they 
cannot resist the urge to beat, and they are psychologically predisposed to harm 
their loved ones.  Arguing for the propensity purpose poses several distinct and 
serious problems, namely in focusing on the pathology of the individual batterer 
rather than the offense itself, as well as the fact that bending the rule for propensity 
purposes flies in the face of the well-rooted foundations and rationales behind the 
general character evidence ban.  People should not be punished for who they are, 
the saying goes, but rather for what they do. 
The propensity rationale for prior acts admission in domestic violence 
prosecutions is not what this Comment advocates.  Rather, Maine’s Law Court 
could look to its New England counterpart in Vermont, who has articulated within 
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the context of its decisions that admitting prior acts in domestic violence 
prosecutions is allowable.  In its 1998 decision of State v. Sanders,237 the Vermont 
Supreme Court held in an appeal involving aggravated domestic assault that 
evidence of prior incidents of domestic abuse was relevant to portray the history 
surrounding the abusive relationship and thus was admissible.238  The facts 
themselves were quite typical of a domestic assault prosecution.  The assault itself 
stemmed from a March 31, 1996, incident in which the victim was threatened with 
a knife by her live-in boyfriend, who said, “[S]omeone is going to die  . . . who’s it 
gonna be?”239  The state prosecutors informed the defense that it would be 
introducing two prior assaults upon the victim at trial.240  Over the defendant’s 
motion in limine to exclude the acts, which included an incident when the 
defendant choked the victim and bloodied her nose, the trial court admitted 
evidence of both acts, even though the victim recanted on the stand her statements 
to the police.241  The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of this 
evidence.242  The court reasoned: 
[W]e need not decide whether the prior bad acts may be admissible solely to show 
fear or intent because the evidence was relevant also to portray the history 
surrounding the abusive relationship, providing the needed context for the 
behavior in issue.  The purpose of establishing defendant’s history of abusing the 
victim is not to show his general character for such abuse, but to provide the jury 
with an understanding of defendant’s actions on the date in question.243 
The court continued to explain that: 
Allegations of a single act of domestic violence, taken out of its situational 
context, are likely to seem “incongruous and incredible” to a jury. . . .  Without 
knowing the history of the relationship between the defendant and the victim, 
jurors may not believe the victim was actually abused, since domestic violence is 
“learned, . . . controlling behavior aimed at gaining another’s compliance” through 
multiple incidents.244 
The court also determined that prior acts of abuse were relevant to “put the victim’s 
recantation of prior statements into context for the jury.”245  The court recognized 
that:  
Victims of domestic abuse are likely to change their stories out of fear of 
retribution, or even out of misguided affection. . . .  This prior history of abuse 
gives the jury an understanding of why the victim is less than candid in her 
testimony and allows them to decide more accurately which of the victim’s 
statements more reliably reflect reality.246 
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Thus, without relying on propensity reasoning, the court held that prior acts of 
abuse were relevant and necessary for the prosecution to paint a more complete and 
accurate picture of the domestic violence on trial.247  The court focused on the 
cyclical nature of domestic violence when determining admissibility of the prior 
acts evidence rather than the propensity of the offender to commit violence.  
Because Maine is facing a domestic violence crisis, the Law Court simply 
cannot wait for the appropriate case to make its common law declaration, as did the 
Vermont Supreme Court.  Further, because prior acts evidence has largely been 
excluded in non-homicide and non-sexual offense prosecutions, the question of the 
admissibility of prior acts evidence in the context of the battering relationship may 
never reach the court.  The Law Court must be proactive; it must amend the Maine 
Rules of Evidence. 
However, rather than amend the text of Rule 404, the Law Court should amend 
its advisors’ note, explaining when and how prior acts evidence could be relevant.  
The new text, in order to allow prosecutors to introduce prior acts evidence 
between the defendant and the victim in domestic violence prosecutions, would 
read: 
Subdivision (b) deals with evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  Such 
evidence is not admissible to prove character in order to show that a person acted 
in conformity therewith.  The subdivision does not exclude the evidence when 
offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or, in 
domestic violence-related crimes, to establish the context of the abusive 
relationship.  This listing of possible exceptions to the general prohibition on prior 
acts evidence is not exhaustive.248 
The amendment would recognize that domestic violence crimes are different, and 
that the state’s rules of evidence should reflect the particular cyclical nature of 
domestic violence by allowing prior acts into evidence to give jurors the necessary 
context of the relationship between the accused and the victim.  The legislative 
opportunity to criminalize domestic violence as a course of conduct crime has been 
lost.  In order to re-inject the evidentiary vitality of the originally proposed bill, the 
Law Court should move to amend the articulated and recognized exceptions to 
Rule 404(b).  It should do so quickly and it should do so loudly, as a unified voice 
against the domestic violence epidemic in Maine.  In order to close the gap 
between charging and sentencing, jurors should and must understand the context of 
the battering relationship from which the particular charges emerge.  This proposed 
amendment would help close that gap. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Commissioner of Maine’s Department of Public Safety Anne Jordan lamented 
in 2009 that looking at domestic violence in Maine can “be very discouraging, 
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because the arrests keep coming and the deaths keep occurring.”249  There exists a 
disconnect in this state between the number of arrests and the increase in domestic 
violence deaths.  Somewhere between arrest and final adjudication, batterers are 
not being held accountable for their actions.  As such, they are not being subjected 
to the heightened sentencing penalties that would help prevent them from returning 
to their victims to continue their abuse, or, as is too often the case, to kill them. 
This Comment seeks to convince the Law Court to take the lead on the 
initiative to close the gap between arrests and deadly violence.  Understanding that 
domestic violence is a course of conduct crime is essential to its successful 
criminalization in society.  The crime of domestic violence does not comport well 
with traditional evidence bans on prior acts, as domestic violence cannot be 
reduced to a single isolated incident, divorced completely from its context.  
Recognizing this, the efforts of dozens of lawyers, activists, and legislators were 
combined to present a comprehensive bill to criminalize domestic violence.  That 
bill, however, was carved up into incident-specific crimes, eviscerating the intent 
behind the bill and its intended potential effect and power.  In an ironic and tragic 
twist, the same year that Maine adopted these new “domestic violence” laws, it saw 
an enormous increase in the number of domestic-violence-related deaths.250  The 
disconnect between the reality of battering and the law that seeks to address the 
problem has turned deadly. 
Maine’s jurisprudence surrounding prior acts admissibility in criminal 
prosecutions is spotty and inadequately deals with domestic violence.  As it 
currently stands, judicial discretion in much of the state trends toward excluding 
evidence of prior acts in domestic violence cases as either banned by Rule 404(b) 
or as overly prejudicial against the criminal defendant.  As stated by Professor 
Andrew King-Ries, “No other evidence rule goes to the heart of a crime the way 
that the character evidence ban does with domestic violence. The character 
evidence ban prevents the true nature of domestic violence from exposure to public 
scrutiny and, therefore, sanctions and perpetuates domestic violence.”251  The issue 
at hand is not the character of the defendant, but rather, the nature of domestic 
violence itself.  By essentially limiting prior acts evidence in domestic violence 
homicide prosecutions or sexual abuse cases, the Law Court has, in essence, failed 
to recognize the patterned course of conduct that marks domestic violence as 
different from other crimes.   
As a state, and as a society, we can no longer afford tacitly to accept domestic 
violence through our unresponsive criminal law.  If the original L.D. 1627 had 
passed as it was envisioned, amending the state’s rules of evidence would be 
unnecessary.  However, as the code amendments do not and cannot reflect the 
needs and realities of domestic violence victims in the criminal justice system, 
something must be done.  The Law Court must respond.  Domestic violence must 
be criminalized and prosecuted successfully in Maine if we are to ever stem the tide 
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of unrelenting abuse against our women, our children, and our families.  Amending 
our rules of evidence could be an important step in that process. 
